[gal4]

ON MORAL JUSTIFICATION AND THE EUTHYPHRO

In Plato's dialogue the Euthyphro, Euthyphro is trying to justify his actions, i.e., prosecuting his own father, by appealing to the gods. His claim is that it is the "pious" thing to do. This leads Socrates to inquire of Euthyphro, "what is piety." Euthyphro's first (actually, second) response is that what is pious is what is loved by the gods. Socrates points out that the gods often disagree, some thinking that one particular action is pious while others call the same action impious. This is an inadequate definition of the pious, as the same action turns out to be both pious and impious at the same time. This leads Euthyphro to fix his definition by saying that what is loved by all the gods is pious, what is hated by all the gods is impious, and that about which there is disagreement is neither pious nor impious. (Notice that this now brings the argument into a monotheistic context.) In response to this, Socrates asks Euthyphro "do the gods love what is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?" What one can derive from the modernized version of the question (which is "does God do what is good, or is what God does good simply because God does it?") is the following. If God does and commands us to do what is good, and, likewise, forbids us to do what is bad, then presumably God does such things for a reason. If God does these things for a reason, then that reason is what makes the action right or wrong and not the mere fact that God commanded or forbade the action. (Remember the OT example of God forbidding the Hebrews to eat pigs--it was unclean because it was actually unsafe.) On the other hand, if whatever God does is good simply because God does it (which precludes the possibility of God's having a reason for doing the action), then morality is ultimately arbitrary, as we never know from one day to the next what God is going to like or dislike. If one responds that God is only going to like what is good, then this leads her into saying that God does what is good, and not whatever God does is good simply because God does it.

Remember the Jerusalem story. Imagine in 30 A.D., there were two people in Jerusalem doing messiah like things. We gather the town's people together to figure out which one is the messiah. We explain to each of the "messiahs" our problem. So we get them together and ask Jesus #1 to show us some kind of a sign that he is the messiah. He then heals a palsied woman and she runs off singing God's praises. We then ask the same thing of Jesus #2. He picks out a man who we all know to be a decent sort of fellow, neither extremely good nor extremely bad, points his finger at the man, and starts ripping him limb from limb with lightening bolts. Which one is the Messiah? Jesus #1, of course, because he did what was good. But, if what God does is good simply because God does it, we would have no grounds to prefer one messiah over the other. In fact, we would have no way of knowing what, at any given moment, was moral, as we would have no way of knowing whether or not God had changed her preference. If you say that God would never change preferences because God is good, then my point is proven! God does what is good, so our job is to figure out what "good" is.

http://www.utexas.edu/courses/hilde/Philhandouts/Euthyphro(Myers).html

So, now ya know.

Now, one can extend the above argument to say that religion does what is good, and not everything religion does is good, because religion does it.
Yeah.